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Abstract
Th is article assesses the legality at international law of “pro-
tection elsewhere” policies, that is, policies whereby respon-
sibility for refugees is transferred between states such as in 
the US-Canada Safe Th ird Country Agreement. An analysis 
of the operation of such policies in Europe, Australia, and 
North America raises serious concerns about the ability of 
such schemes to uphold their aims and objectives in con-
formity with international law. Th e paper concludes by rec-
ommending that states reconsider the utility and legality of 
such schemes with a view to developing policies that genu-
inely address the need for responsibility sharing.
Résumé
Cet article évalue la légalité en droit international des poli-
tiques dites « protection ailleurs », c.-à-d. les politiques sous 
le couvert desquelles la responsabilité envers les réfugiés est 
transférée entre états, comme c’est le cas avec l’Entente entre 
le Canada et les États Unis sur les tiers pays sûrs. Une analy-
se de l’opération de telles politiques en Europe, en Australie 
et en Amérique du Nord soulève de sérieuses questions sur 
la capacité de tels arrangements à respecter leurs buts et 
objectifs en conformité avec le droit international. L’article 
conclut avec la recommandation que les états reconsidèrent 
l’utilité et la légalité de tels arrangements avec comme objec-
tif le développement de politiques qui répondent réellement 
au besoin de partage de la responsabilité.
Introduction
In recent decades many states, particularly in the developed 
“North,” have increasingly relied on a range of defl ection, 
interception, and transfer policies in an attempt to minimize 
their own obligations towards refugees under the Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention). 
While many of these occur off shore and are thus diffi  cult to 
monitor, a more prominent practice has been the formula-
tion of “protection elsewhere” policies such as the adoption 
of the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the United States of America for Cooperation 
in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from Nationals of 
Th ird Countries (the US-Canada STCA). Agreements such as 
these apply to refugee applicants once they have successfully 
avoided or overcome other hurdles constructed by states 
such as interdiction, carrier sanctions, and defl ection poli-
cies. In an increasingly large number of states, refugees fi nd 
that arriving at or entering the territory of a state party is 
not the end of the journey because they are then informed 
that they will be sent to a “safe third country”—oft en, but not 
necessarily, one in which they transited en route to their fi nal 
destination. Th is paper is concerned with the legality of such 
policies at international law. A protection elsewhere policy, 
as considered in this paper, refers to a situation in which a 
state or agency acts on the basis that the protection needs 
of a refugee should be considered or addressed somewhere 
other than in the territory of the state where the refugee has 
sought, or intends to seek, protection.1 While sometimes as-
cribed diff erent labels, including “country of fi rst asylum” or 
“safe third country,” the core legal question remains the same, 
viz., whether a state may defl ect its responsibility under inter-
national law by transferring a refugee to another state.2 Th is 
paper will analyze the US-Canada STCA and its surrounding 
litigation in some depth, but is not restricted to this particu-
lar manifestation of the safe third country concept.
Th ere are various methods by which protection elsewhere 
policies are implemented. Th e fi rst is through a formal multi-
lateral assignment scheme such as the Dublin Regulation II, 
in which the state through which the applicant for asylum en-
tered the EU is responsible for dealing with the application, 
even if it is lodged in another Member State. Th e second is a 
formal bilateral assignment scheme such as the US-Canada 
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STCA, which provides that the country of last presence shall 
examine the refugee status claim of any person arriving at a 
land border port of entry who makes a refugee claim.3 Th e 
third is what we might call “unilateral” transfer schemes 
such as are eff ected in Australian law via section 36(3) of the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which excludes from protection a 
person “who has not taken all possible steps to avail himself 
or herself of a right to enter and reside in, whether temporar-
ily or permanently, any country apart from Australia.”
Th e key diff erence between these schemes is that in the 
case of multilateral and bilateral schemes there is a written 
agreement between the relevant state parties which, at least 
theoretically, have reasonably comparable systems of refugee 
status determination and protection and thus purport to be 
concerned with the allocation of responsibility between com-
parable Member States. In these scenarios there is at least a 
theoretical possibility that “responsibility sharing” could en-
sure fair and equitable allocation of protection responsibil-
ities as between states.4 By contrast, in the case of unilateral 
removals, where there is not necessarily any readmission or 
other written agreement, nor any meaningful analysis of the 
situation pertaining in the “other country,” it is more accur-
ate to view these schemes as an attempt to avoid responsibil-
ity rather than sharing it fairly as between state parties.
However even the bilateral and multilateral schemes have 
given rise to serious concerns. First, one might question 
the responsibility sharing objective given that, for example, 
in the EU context, the Dublin Regulation does not contain 
any mechanism for ensuring that responsibility is shared in 
an equitable manner. As the European Parliament recently 
noted, it “fails to serve as a burden-sharing mechanism.”5 
Rather, the experience has been, unsurprisingly, that respon-
sibilities have shift ed towards the border states.6
Second, divergence of policies and practices even within 
a theoretically “harmonized” system, such as is established 
in the EU,7 means there is signifi cant inequity in the sys-
tem which has resulted in an “asylum lottery.” For example, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) reports that a Chechen transferred from Austria 
to Slovakia sees his or her chance of being granted refugee 
status going from 80 per cent to 0 per cent.8 Similarly, the 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) notes that 
in 2007 recognition rates for Iraqis varied from 0 per cent 
in Greece and Slovenia to 87.5 per cent in Cyprus.9 Even 
in the context of the bilateral US-Canada STCA—an agree-
ment between two very similar state parties to the Refugee 
Convention—there have been many concerns raised as to 
the adequacy of the US system to fully uphold Article 33 
of the Refugee Convention.10 Th us, at present, protection 
elsewhere is more of a challenge than an opportunity for 
refugee protection.
Lawfulness of Protection Elsewhere Schemes
Th e adoption and implementation of protection elsewhere 
policies is now so well entrenched in state practice, and os-
tensibly approved by the UNHCR, that one may assume it 
is futile to consider whether such policies are permitted at 
international law. However the legality of the schemes is 
rarely a question capable of litigation before domestic courts 
in light of domestic jurisdictional limits, and thus the inter-
national law arguments have rarely been canvassed and ad-
dressed in any depth. For example, in Canadian Council for 
Refugees v. R, Phelan J. noted that “there may be an issue of 
whether a Canadian law which requires a person to make 
their refugee claim in a country, other than the one of their 
choosing, is compliant with the Refugee Convention.”11 
However, he concluded that in the absence of other evidence, 
“it is presumed that Canadian law is at least compliant with 
the relevant Conventions.”12 It is useful at the outset to note 
that while the Federal Court of Appeal overturned Justice 
Phelan’s decision to grant an application for judicial review 
declaring invalid sections 159.1 to 159.7 of the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Regulations and the STCA, Justice 
Phelan’s assessment of the STCA’s compliance with the 
Refugee Convention remains relevant.13 Th is is because 
the reason for overturning Justice Phelan’s decision was not 
that his Honour’s assessment that the STCA is inconsistent 
with Article 33 of the Refugee Convention was incorrect 
as a matter of fact or law, but rather that this was not the 
proper question to be resolved by the Court. Justice Phelan 
had assumed that compliance with Article 33 (and Article 
3 of the Convention Against Torture) was a condition pre-
cedent to the Governor-in-Council’s exercise of its delegated 
authority to designate the US as a safe third country, and that 
since aspects of the US asylum process are inconsistent with 
both relevant treaties, the STCA and accompanying regula-
tions are ultra vires.14 However the Federal Court of Appeal 
found that the correct inquiry was not as to whether there 
was actual compliance with international law, but rather only 
whether the Governor-in-Council had considered the factors 
set out in the Act (including compliance with Article 33) 
prior to making the designation.15 In light of the fact that the 
reason for overturning Justice Phelan’s decision was a tech-
nical rather than substantive one,16 reference will continue 
to be made to his Honour’s consideration of the substantive 
questions of actual compliance.
Turning then to the question of whether Justice Phelan 
was correct to raise the issue whether protection elsewhere 
policies are permitted at international law, the starting point 
must of course be the text of the Refugee Convention.17 Th e 
Refugee Convention does not explicitly authorize a transfer of 
a refugee or applicant for refugee status from one state party 
to another. Rather, authority for the legality of such transfers 
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is assumed to be found in an omission in the text, namely, the 
lack of a right to be granted asylum. As is well understood, the 
Refugee Convention prohibits a state from returning a person 
to a state in which he or she will be exposed to persecution 
(the obligation of non-refoulement in Article 33). It is thus 
oft en assumed by state parties that as long as Article 33 is not 
violated, the state is free to transfer a refugee to a third state. 
Indeed, so much was assumed in the concurring opinion of 
Evans J.A. in the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, where his 
Honour asserted in passing that the “provisions of neither the 
international Conventions relied on in this litigation, nor the 
Charter, require Canada to abstain from enacting regulations 
which may deter nationals of third countries in the United 
States from coming to the Canadian border to claim refugee 
protection or protection from torture.”18 Th is was said to be 
because both Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and Article 
3 of the CAT “impose a negative obligation not to refoule, not a 
positive obligation to receive potential claimants.”19
Interestingly however an analysis of the text of the Refugee 
Convention reveals that it is not silent as to the circumstances 
in which a person may be excluded from protection on the 
basis that he or she is able to obtain protection elsewhere. 
Rather there are three situations in which a state may de-
cline to protect a person because he or she can obtain protec-
tion elsewhere: where a person has more than one national-
ity, he will not satisfy the defi nition of refugee if “he has not 
availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of 
which he is a national” (Article 1A(2)); where a person has 
de facto nationality in another country the Convention “shall 
not apply” (Article 1E); and where a refugee acquires a new 
nationality and enjoys the protection of the country of new 
nationality the Convention “shall cease to apply” (Article 
1C). Importantly, in each of these situations the refugee 
enjoys a level of protection in a third country greater than 
that provided in the Refugee Convention since in each case 
the refugee will enjoy equivalent protection to that enjoyed 
by nationals in the third state, whereas in some instances the 
Refugee Convention dictates a lower standard of protection 
for refugees than that enjoyed by nationals.20
Th e explicit reference to these carefully defi ned circum-
stances in which the availability of protection elsewhere can 
exclude a person from refugee protection might be thought 
to be exhaustive of the situations in which a state can de-
cline to protect on this basis—that is, an application of the 
expressio unius principle.21 Th is may further be supported by 
reference to the context, object, and purpose of the Refugee 
Convention, matters appropriately considered under the 
rules of treaty interpretation,22 which could be said to sup-
port the view that the Convention requires states to engage 
in international co-operation to protect refugees, not defl ect 
responsibility to other states.
Th e diffi  culty with the textual argument however is that 
the exclusions above all speak to the defi nition of a refugee 
and thus to who qualifi es for protection. In the context of 
protection elsewhere practices and policies, such as the US-
Canada STCA, there is no suggestion that a transferred refu-
gee applicant is excluded from protection, but rather that 
the claim for protection is more appropriately assessed and 
implemented in another state. Further, there is a contra indi-
cation in the text, in that Article 32 prohibits the expulsion 
of refugees other than in exceptional circumstances, but this 
only applies to those refugees “lawfully present” in a state’s 
territory.23 Th e adoption of the concept of lawful presence 
was a deliberate choice and is to be distinguished from other 
levels of attachment such as refugees who are merely within 
a state party’s jurisdiction or territory.24 It thus suggests that 
there is a period between a refugee coming within the juris-
diction of a state party and attaining the status of lawful pres-
ence during which he or she may be lawfully transferred to 
another state. However this conclusion does not mean that a 
state is untrammelled in its decision to transfer. We thus now 
turn to a consideration of what constraints are imposed on 
any decision to transfer.
Refugee Rights Other than Article 33
No state has ever asserted that there are no constraints what-
ever pertaining to a decision to transfer a refugee or asylum 
seeker to a third state; rather all states accept that at the very 
least Article 33 of the Refugee Convention must be respected 
in any decision to transfer. Th e content of that requirement 
may be subject to debate, an issue to which this article will 
turn below, but the fundamental relevance of Article 33 is 
accepted.
However what is much more controversial is whether there 
are any other obligations relevant to a decision to transfer a 
refugee. In general, states tend to assert that Article 33 is the 
only relevant Refugee Convention obligation, and in much 
of the jurisprudence it is assumed by courts, either implicitly 
or explicitly, that Article 33 is the only relevant considera-
tion. In the Canadian litigation, for example, Justice Phelan 
concluded, following a discussion of relevant comparative 
case law, that “the focus of the Convention is on protection 
against refoulement and as long as the third party protects in 
practice against refoulement, other distinctions will not bar 
return.”25 In reaching this conclusion his Honour did not 
consider the relevance of other rights to this context from 
a principled perspective but rather relied on his Honour’s 
view of the comparative case law. Indeed he primarily relied 
on Lord Bingham’s judgment in Yogathas in which his 
Lordship stated that “the Convention is primarily directed 
to preventing refoulement and it is inappropriate to compare 
other issues between two states, such as the applicant’s living 
Volume 25 Refuge Number 2
66
Refuge25-2.indd   66 5/25/10   5:51:29 PM
conditions in the third country.”26 However the relevance of 
other rights has rarely been directly argued and considered 
as a discrete issue in the jurisprudence and thus the persua-
siveness of previous authority on this point is open to ques-
tion since it is not the outcome of a considered assessment of 
the competing arguments but rather largely represents obi-
ter comments in judgments otherwise primarily concerned 
with Article 33 as a constraint. By contrast, several expert 
affi  davits produced in the Canadian Federal Court directly 
addressed this issue, representing possibly the most compre-
hensive elucidation of the competing arguments presented 
to a court to date.27 Justice Phelan’s rather cursory dismissal 
of this important argument is particularly curious in light of 
this, particularly given that a number of Refugee Convention 
rights other than Article 33 were asserted to be at risk on 
return to the US,28 but perhaps is explained on the basis that 
under the Canadian legislation, Article 33 was the key focus 
of an inquiry into the validity of the Agreement.29
Th is raises the question as to what is the correct position 
as a matter of international law. Th e Refugee Convention in 
fact contains many rights other than Article 33, and it might 
be argued that those rights already acquired by a refugee in 
the sending state are relevant to determining the validity of 
safe third country agreements. As soon as a refugee is within 
the territory of a state party (regardless of whether he or she 
has been recognized as a refugee by the state party), he or she 
is entitled to the following rights: Article 3 (non-discrimin-
ation); Article 4 (freedom of religion); Article 13 (right to 
property); Article 16(1) (access to the courts); Article 20 
(equality of access to rationing); Article 22 (right to educa-
tion); Article 25 (administrative assistance); Article 27 (iden-
tity papers); Article 29 (freedom from fi scal charges); Article 
31(1) (non-penalization for illegal entry or presence); Article 
31(2) (freedom from constraints on freedom of movement 
unless necessary); Article 33 (non-refoulement); and Article 
34 (consideration for naturalization). In addition, the refu-
gee has the possibility of acquiring further rights as his or her 
connection with the state strengthens.
Th ere is a strong argument that once a refugee has acquired 
rights in the sending state, the sending state must ensure that 
those rights are respected in the receiving state.30 Th is view 
has some judicial support. In overturning the “common law” 
doctrine of “eff ective protection” that had been developed 
by the Federal Court of Australia, in NAGV v. Minister the 
High Court of Australia noted that one of the problems with 
this doctrine was that it assumed that the only “protection 
obligations” which Australia owed to refugees (and thus the 
only obligation relevant to a decision to transfer) was that 
contained in Article 33. However, as the High Court noted, 
the Convention contains a number of other requirements in-
cluding the provision of free access to courts and the right 
to religious freedom.31 Th e implication was that, as a mat-
ter of treaty interpretation, more than mere compliance with 
Article 33 is required in order to eff ect a lawful transfer.32
Th is is consistent with general principles of internation-
al law. As the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
has noted, a sending state cannot avoid the obligations it 
has incurred under human rights treaties (in that case the 
European Convention on Human Rights) vis-à-vis refu-
gees within territory simply by transferring them under the 
Dublin Convention; nor can it “contract out” of its legal obli-
gations.33 Th is is also recognized in European Parliamentary 
Resolution 1569 (2007) in which states are reminded that the 
transfer of refugees off shore cannot “absolve a state from its re-
sponsibilities,”34 and has received support from the Assistant 
High Commissioner—Protection of the UNHCR.35
Th is reasoning applies even more strongly in the context 
of the Refugee Convention than in the context of general hu-
man rights treaties. Th e Refugee Convention’s purpose is to 
impose obligations on states regarding a specifi c group of 
persons. While the Convention does not impose obligations 
on states to deliver rights to refugees in the abstract, state 
parties have assumed obligations to deliver rights to refugees 
with whom they have a connection, in some cases based on 
mere physical presence. If it were possible to circumvent the 
considerable range of obligations imposed on state parties by 
simply transferring a refugee to another state, this would de-
feat the raison d’être of the Convention.36
Indeed, evidence suggests that rights other than non-re-
foulement alone are oft en considered critical to refugees’ own 
idea of what amounts to “protection.”37 For example, Grabska 
notes that in Egypt, due to the number of reservations to the 
Refugee Convention made by Egypt, the rights of refugees 
and asylum seekers are signifi cantly constrained; so much 
so that “the possibility of full integration in terms of access 
to citizenship, civil, political, social, economic and cultural 
rights in Egypt for refugees is eff ectively ruled out.”38 In her 
fi eldwork, Grabska found that the key concern expressed by 
refugees was eff ective protection and security. Importantly, 
refugees view such protection “not only in terms of being free 
from random arrests and deportation, but also in terms of 
having access to basic human rights, such as the right to edu-
cation, work, housing and health services.”39 Grabska quotes 
one Rwandan refugee: “Having a blue card is nonsense, it is 
like being in a prison, but even the prison is better because 
you are fed there. But we are not given any help so how are 
we expected to survive?”40 Th is explains why it is that many 
refugees have chosen to leave Egypt and seek refuge in nearby 
states such as Israel; and seriously calls into question whether 
refugees can legally be returned to Egypt by Israel under the 
assumption that it is a safe third country.41
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Th is has become an increasingly important issue in re-
cent times in the context of returns to Greece by EU Member 
States pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. Th e question 
whether Greece can be considered a safe third country has 
been the subject of debate for some time,42 but has be-
come acute since the UNHCR published a position paper 
in April 2008 calling for all EU Members States “to refrain 
from returning asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin 
Regulation until further notice.”43 In addition to concerns 
about the ability of returnees under Dublin to access an ad-
equate asylum procedure in Greece, the UNHCR and other 
organizations have pointed to the fact that Greece has failed 
to implement even the minimal standards set out in the EU 
Reception Directive—a directive that aims to provide min-
imum standards for the reception of asylum seekers “that 
will normally suffi  ce to ensure them a dignifi ed standard of 
living.”44 In 2007 the European Court of Justice found that 
Greece had failed to adopt Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 
January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the recep-
tion of asylum seekers (the Reception Directive) on the basis 
that it failed to adopt, within the prescribed period, “the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to com-
ply” and had thus “failed to fulfi l its obligations under Article 
26 of that directive.”45 It is arguable that failure to implement 
the Reception Directive is prima facie evidence that a state is 
in violation of international obligations including under the 
Refugee Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICECSR), given that in 
many respects the Reception Directive sets a lower standard 
than that required by these international treaties.46
As a result of these concerns, a number of EU Member 
States have begun halting transfers of all or some asylum 
seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation. Most rel-
evant for present purposes is the fact that in some cases the 
prohibition on transfer has not been imposed due to con-
cerns that Article 33 is at risk of violation, but rather due 
wholly or in part to the human rights situation for asylum 
seekers in Greece. For example, in May 2008 the Swedish 
Migration Board decided to halt the deportation of children 
to Greece on the basis of a real risk that children will be de-
tained in Greece while awaiting determination of status.47 
Further, during 2008 several lower administrative courts in 
Germany issued a temporary stay of proceedings preventing 
the German government from transferring asylum seekers 
to Greece in respect of a number of (adult) asylum seekers. 
In a decision of 25 April 2008 the administrative court (VG) 
in Giessen issued a temporary stay of proceedings for a per-
iod of six months due to the inhuman conditions for asylum 
seekers in Greece contrary to the Reception Directive and to 
the Asylum Procedures Directive.48 In another decision of 21 
August 2008 the administrative court in Hamburg issued a 
temporary stay of proceedings on the basis that the return was 
not possible because of the danger of serious detriment to the 
asylum seeker, specifi cally the “conditions not conforming to 
human rights standards in the asylum seeker camps and the 
asylum proceedings that do not even approximately comply 
with the minimum legal standards.”49
Th is is consistent with the UNHCR position paper which 
refers to the “[p]roblematic reception conditions for un-
accompanied minors, in particular access to health, educa-
tion and welfare during the course of the asylum proced-
ures,”50 as well as the “extremely limited reception facilities 
for asylum-seekers” including lack of accommodation and 
access to employment.51
It is unclear whether the reference to human rights in these 
decisions is a reference to rights contained in the Refugee 
Convention or other international human rights treaties, 
although explicit reference to the EU Reception Directive 
suggests that consideration of Refugee Convention rights 
is considered relevant. In any event, while there may be 
some debate concerning the extent to which other Refugee 
Convention rights are determinative in this inquiry, there is 
no question that general human rights treaties such as the 
ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights 
constrain a state in its ability to expel, deport, or transfer a 
person to another state, under a safe third country regime 
or otherwise.52 At the very least, a state is prohibited from 
removing a person where there is a real risk that his or her 
right to life, or right not to be subjected to torture, or to cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment, will be violated.53
Of particular relevance to the present context, “inhuman 
or degrading treatment” has been interpreted so as to apply 
to a violation of socio-economic rights. For example, in 
Limbuela, the House of Lords found that the UK’s policy of 
prohibiting asylum seekers from receiving welfare benefi ts 
when their applications were not fi led “as soon as reasonably 
practicable” amounted to “inhuman or degrading treatment” 
in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. As Lord Bingham explained, this was because 
an asylum seeker “with no means and no alternative sources 
of support, unable to support himself is, by the deliberate ac-
tion of the state, denied shelter, food or the most basic neces-
sities of life.”54 As to whether this action amounted to “treat-
ment” for the purposes of Article 3, Lord Hope emphasized 
that the “imposition by the legislature of a regime which pro-
hibits asylum seekers from working and further prohibits the 
grant to them, when they are destitute, of support amounts 
to positive action directed against asylum seekers and not 
mere inaction.”55 In the context of the ICCPR, the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) has routinely found states in viola-
tion of Article 7 where they have subjected persons within 
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their control, such as prisoners and detainees, to a depriva-
tion of socio-economic rights.56
In assessing whether treatment of transferred refugees/
asylum seekers in the third state is likely to amount to de-
grading treatment, it is vital that regard be had to the par-
ticular vulnerability of children, especially in the area of 
socio-economic rights. Th is approach is consistent with the 
views of the Committee on the Rights of the Child which has 
emphasized that the non-refoulement obligations implied in 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child apply:
… irrespective of whether serious violations of those rights 
guaranteed under the Convention originate from non-State ac-
tors or whether such violations are directly intended or are the 
indirect consequence of action or inaction. Th e assessment of 
the risk of such serious violations should be conducted in an 
age and gender-sensitive manner and should, for example, take 
into account the particularly serious consequences for children 
of the insuffi  cient provision of food or health services.57
Th us, where there is evidence of a real risk that asylum 
seekers will be subjected to such treatment on transfer under 
a safe third country arrangement, the sending state is pro-
hibited from eff ecting such transfer under international law. 
Th is analysis therefore suggests that it is incumbent upon 
states to consider rights other than Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention alone in assessing the legality of transfers pur-
suant to a protection elsewhere scheme or policy. Th us, the 
assumption that nothing other than Article 33 is relevant is 
clearly unsustainable as a matter of international law.
However, even if it were assumed that Article 33 is the 
only relevant constraint on a decision to transfer a refugee to 
a third state, it is important to note that rights violations in 
the third state can be relevant to an Article 33 analysis on a 
number of bases.
First, it may be that the conditions or treatment meted out 
to refugees in the third state in fact amount to persecution on 
the basis of race, religion, or nationality, both in the form of 
more traditional methods of persecution (such as violence) 
but particularly in the context of a violation of social and eco-
nomic rights.58 Th is is of course very unlikely to be an issue 
in the context of the US-Canada STCA, but such arguments 
may well be made in the context of Israel’s recently renewed 
policy of returning refugees to Egypt, in light of the situation 
described above. Another example is provided in the context 
of Indonesia—a country through which many refugees pass 
en route to Australia and which has been considered in the 
past by the Australian authorities to be a country in which 
a refugee may have received eff ective protection.59 However 
according to the UNHCR offi  ce in Jakarta, Indonesia can-
not be considered to provide eff ective protection because 
inter alia, “[t]here is no lawful access for these persons to 
the labour market and thus they are not able to work legally, 
which obviates any adequate and dignifi ed means of exist-
ence. Th ere is no possibility of exercising any civil, economic, 
social or cultural rights.”60 Th is may well amount to persecu-
tion for reasons of race or nationality or even membership of 
a particular social group.61
Second, it might be argued that a violation of socio-
economic rights in the third country may amount to con-
structive refoulement, particularly if such conditions were 
so harsh as to give rise to a serious likelihood that refugees 
would risk returning home rather than tolerate the harsh 
conditions.
Th ird, the “reception conditions” aff orded to refugees 
in the receiving state may also be relevant to the question 
whether the refugee is able to access a “fair and eff ective 
asylum procedure,” which of course has a direct bearing on 
whether the third state will engage in refoulement, discussed 
below. Indeed, this has been noted by the UNHCR in the 
context of Greece, discussed above. As the UNHCR notes, 
“it is essential to enable asylum seekers to sustain themselves 
during the asylum process, not only out of respect for their 
rights, but also to ensure a fair and eff ective asylum proced-
ure.”62 Similarly, ECRE has expressed concern that reception 
standards vary widely across Member States, particularly in 
relation to access to health care, including psychiatric assist-
ance and facilities—an issue that may bear directly on the 
fairness of an adjudication procedure.63 Th is analysis refl ects 
the idea of the “interdependence of rights”—a concept rec-
ognized more broadly in international human rights law and 
scholarship and one that needs to be more fully understood 
and implemented in refugee law.
Th is analysis leads to the conclusion that it is essential that 
any state wishing to implement a safe third country or pro-
tection elsewhere policy ensure that the human rights condi-
tions in the third state are assessed as part of the decision to 
transfer.
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention
Even if there is no risk that a refugee will suff er persecution 
or other human rights violations in a third state, there are 
still many important issues which must be considered by the 
sending state in order to ensure that there is not a risk of 
indirect refoulement. It is well accepted that Article 33 ap-
plies to indirect refoulement as well as direct refoulement; 
that is, just as a state is prohibited from returning a refugee 
directly to a state in which he or she will be exposed to per-
secution, a state cannot return or transfer a refugee to a third 
state where it is foreseeable that the receiving state will in 
turn send the refugee back to a country of persecution.64 Th e 
question arises therefore as to what factors the sending state 
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must consider in assessing whether indirect refoulement is 
foreseeable.
First, the sending state must be satisfi ed that the third (re-
ceiving) state has an adjudication procedure in place to assess 
refugee status. While the Refugee Convention does not dir-
ectly impose any procedural requirements on state parties, it 
is well accepted that if a state is to avoid violation of a non-
refoulement obligation such as Article 33, it must institute an 
adequate system of status determination to enable it to ascer-
tain whom it must protect from refoulement.65 It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to explore in depth the parameters 
of an adequate status determination system; however, the 
UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner—Protection has 
helpfully identifi ed the “core elements” or “hallmarks of an 
eff ective system for the determination of refugee status” as 
follows:
a) a single, specialised fi rst instance body with qualifi ed deci-
sion-makers, trained and supported with country of origin in-
formation; b) adequate resources to ensure effi  ciency, to identify 
those in need of protection quickly and to curb abuse; and c) an 
appeal to an authority diff erent from and independent of that 
making the initial decision.66
Another UNHCR report prepared for the 2001 Global 
Consultations concluded that all applicants should “receive 
a written decision automatically,” and that where a claim is 
rejected or declared inadmissible, “the decision should be a 
reasoned one.”67 Further, an “asylum seeker should in prin-
ciple have the right to remain on the territory of the asylum 
country and should not be removed, excluded or deported 
until a fi nal decision has been made on the case.”68
How might a sending state assess whether the intended 
recipient state’s refugee status determination procedures are 
adequate? It would seem that recognition rates might be a 
useful starting point. For example, the fact that the recogni-
tion rate for both refugee status and subsidiary protection 
in Greece was only 1.22 per cent in 2006 suggests prima fa-
cie that Greece does not comply with Article 33.69 Further, 
monitoring and supervision by the UNHCR might provide 
some helpful insight. For example, a UNHCR assessment of 
refugee decisions by the Greek authorities found that of the 
305 decisions studied, none provided any information about 
the facts of the case or any detailed legal reasoning.70 Rather, 
they all contained a standard paragraph alleging that “it is 
obvious that s/he abandoned his country in order to fi nd a 
job and improve his living conditions.”71 Th is serves to em-
phasize the importance of UNHCR presence in any supposed 
safe third country, in that it is vital that information be avail-
able as to the quality of protection “on the ground”—an issue 
which in many cases may be peculiarly within the UNHCR’s 
authority to obtain. Th is is not to say that UNHCR’s view on 
whether a country is a safe third country is conclusive or can 
obviate the sending state’s obligation to ensure that transfers 
comply with its own international obligations;72 rather it 
highlights the need for a method of obtaining information 
as to the practical reality for transferred refugees in the third 
state.
Th is, however, raises a very interesting question as to 
whether a refugee can be transferred to a state in which the 
UNHCR itself undertakes refugee status determination, par-
ticularly given that UNHCR procedure has been criticized 
for, inter alia, its failure to “provide applicants with specifi c 
explanations for their rejections” and its lack of independent 
review of fi rst level determinations.73 Th is is not an academic 
question, given that the UNHCR is currently undertaking 
refugee status determination in seventy-one states, of which 
forty are states party to the Refugee Convention (where there 
are no, or inadequate, national procedures) and thirty-one 
are not party to the Refugee Convention.74 However as a re-
sult of sustained critique in recent years, the UNHCR has 
committed to improved procedures and additional training, 
including the publication of procedural standards in 2005, 
which appears to have resulted in improved refugee status 
determination including a higher rate of recognition of refu-
gee claims.75 It remains an issue, however, which must be 
considered by a sending state, particularly where transfer 
will remove a refugee applicant from a highly sophisticated 
system of refugee status determination, as is found in coun-
tries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.76
Second, the third (receiving) state must guarantee access 
to that system for refugees in question; thus, for example, 
the sending state must ensure that refugees are not barred 
from the system by procedural rules or other impediments. 
Th e adequacy of any refugee status determination system 
is irrelevant if an applicant transferred under a “protec-
tion elsewhere” scheme will not have access to that process 
on transfer.77 Th is has been an issue on which a number of 
courts have focused. For example, in Canadian Council for 
Refugees v. R, Justice Phelan found that the requirement that 
asylum claims be fi led within one year in the US (and thus 
that claims may be barred for failure to comply with this pro-
vision) is not consistent with the Refugee Convention, thus 
putting Canada at risk of a violation of Article 33 if refugees 
are transferred there. Similarly, in Kilic v. State of Belgium, the 
Belgian Conseil d’État took into account evidence that the 
applicant would have diffi  culty reopening his asylum claim 
in Greece in deciding to suspend the removal order made 
by the Belgian authorities under the Dublin Regulation. Th e 
Court held: “[t]here is an important risk that the applicant is 
being sent to a country which does not adequately respect his 
right to have his asylum claim seriously considered.”78 Th us, 
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refugees must have a meaningful legal and factual opportun-
ity to make a claim for protection in a third state.79
Th ird, the sending state must be satisfi ed that the receiving 
state interprets the Refugee Convention in a manner that re-
spects the “true and autonomous meaning” of the defi nition 
in Article 1 of the Convention.80 In other words, if a person 
is likely to be recognized as a refugee in the sending state but, 
due to diff erences in interpretation, is unlikely to be so rec-
ognized in the state to which transfer is being considered, the 
sending state is prohibited from transferring the applicant to 
the third state. While minor diff erences will be permitted, if 
the diff erences are “signifi cant,” meaning that they will result 
in diff erent treatment, then a state may not transfer a refugee 
to a third state.81 As Justice Phelan concluded in Canadian 
Council of Refugees v. R., “it should be presumed that where 
there is a diff erence in interpretation, there will be a diff er-
ence in treatment.”82 Th is relates both to issues such as stan-
dards of proof and also to defi nitional issues.
In terms of the standard of proof, in Canadian Council 
for Refugees v. R., Justice Phelan found that the higher stan-
dard of proof applied in the US to those seeking withhold-
ing of removal, that is, “more likely than not” as opposed to 
“well founded fear,” is not consistent with Article 33. One 
method by which this might be established is by considering 
statistics: in the Canadian challenge, the Court took note of 
Deborah E. Anker’s evidence that the grant rate for with-
holding is three times lower than in respect of asylum claims. 
Conversely in TI the ECHR noted, in response to a challenge 
based on Germany’s high burden of proof, that “the record of 
Germany in granting asylum claims gives an indication that 
the threshold being applied is not excessively high.”83
Turning to the substantive issues, in Canadian Council of 
Refugees v. R., Justice Phelan found that, in a number of re-
spects, the approach of US decision makers to interpreting 
the refugee defi nition was suffi  ciently diff erent to that of 
Canada as to suggest that it was not reasonable for Canada 
to consider the US a safe third country. Th ese diff erences in-
cluded an overly expansive view of the exclusion clauses and 
an unduly narrow approach to the inclusion clause especially 
as relevant to gender based claims.84 Th is careful assessment 
of the diff erences is necessary in order for the sending state 
to satisfy itself that there is no risk of indirect refoulement on 
transfer.
A recent analysis by the UNHCR of the implementation of 
the EU Qualifi cation Directive reveals that there is still con-
siderable divergence among Member States in interpreting 
the defi nition of “refugee” including diff erences in respect of 
non-state agents of persecution,85 the actors capable of pro-
viding protection,86 and the exclusion clause.87 Th is serves 
to reinforce the fact that a state that wishes to transfer even 
within a somewhat harmonized system must still assess 
whether the receiving state adopts the correct international 
meaning of the Refugee Convention before carrying out a 
transfer.
Procedural Safeguards
Th e analysis above has considered the factors which a send-
ing state must take into account in assessing whether a trans-
fer may be carried out in compliance with international law. 
Th is part now turns to consider the method by which this 
assessment is to be carried out by the sending state.
A state cannot make a blanket determination that a third 
state is safe and will deliver Convention rights for all refu-
gees; nor can it rely on a safe third country agreement or as-
surances from a third state.88 Rather, refugees who are be-
ing considered for transfer must have an ability to challenge 
the transfer decision in their particular case. As the House 
of Lords has said, a state is “under a duty to inform itself of 
the facts and monitor the decisions made by a third coun-
try in order to satisfy itself that the third country will not 
send the applicant to another country otherwise in accord-
ance with the Convention.”89 Th is is because in the absence 
of an individualized assessment, the sending state is at risk of 
a violation of Article 33. Even a country that generally com-
plies with the Refugee Convention may adopt a practice or 
approach to interpretation which places a particular claim-
ant at risk of refoulement; for example, the receiving state 
may take a narrow approach to gender claims or those from 
a particular group such as homosexual men and women. 
Accordingly, the House of Lords has held that although an 
“accelerated procedure” might be acceptable, the need for ef-
fi ciency cannot obviate the need for a court to subject the 
decision to transfer a refugee to a “rigorous examination”90 
or “anxious scrutiny.”91
Indeed, that this is required by the Refugee Convention 
was explicitly accepted by Evans J.A. of the Federal Court 
of Appeal in his concurring opinion in Canadian Council of 
Refugees v. R. In explaining his fi nding that Phelan J.’s dec-
laration of invalidity of the STCA Regulations was “not re-
quired in order to ensure that they are not applied to claim-
ants for protection at the land border in breach of either 
Canada’s international obligations not to refoule, or the 
Charter,”92 Evans J.A. explained that the Regulations are ca-
pable of being construed and applied so as to be consistent 
with Canada’s international obligations. Th at is, they should 
be interpreted so as to ensure that “refugee claimants at the 
Canadian land border may not be turned back to the United 
States pursuant to the STCA Regulations if they can estab-
lish that, if returned, they would face a real risk of their re-
moval by the United States to a country where they have a 
well founded fear of torture, or persecution on a Convention 
ground.”93 Further, such a risk assessment “must be made in 
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respect of individual claimants, in light of the United States’ 
law and practice at that time as it pertains to them.”94 Evans 
J.A. further noted that a denial of access to Canada’s refugee 
determination system “would be subject to an application 
for leave and for judicial review.”95 Of course one may ques-
tion the adequacy of such an individual determination, given 
that, as noted by Phelan J., the Canadian Border Services 
Agency (CBSA) is responsible for determining whether a 
person must be removed under the STCA or is eligible to be 
referred to the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB)—the 
latter rather than the former agency being the highly special-
ized expert refugee status determination agency in Canada. 
It is not clear what expertise the CBSA has to undertake the 
“anxious scrutiny” of a risk of indirect refoulement required 
by international law.96 Although Evans J.A. notes that “[n]o 
doubt guidelines will be developed to assist offi  cers in mak-
ing these eligibility determinations,”97 it is by no means clear 
that this will amount to an adequate procedure. Th is is par-
ticularly so when we consider that the burden should be on 
the sending state to ensure that there is no foreseeable risk 
of refoulement—thus offi  cers will need to be well versed in 
the aspects of US asylum law and practice which potentially 
impact on this assessment and should not expect applicants 
to be cognizant of the risks in their particular case.
In terms of a right of review or appeal against a decision to 
transfer, although available in some jurisdictions, including 
Canada, it is vital that the decision to transfer be suspended 
pending the outcome of any review or appeal in light of the 
potentially serious consequences for an applicant of trans-
fer to a state which does not respect international law. Th is 
has been supported by both the UNHCR and the European 
Parliament following an examination of the diffi  culties which 
arise when a state does not allow for suspension of an order 
to transfer pending appeal, particularly when the decision to 
transfer is later overturned.98
Post-transfer Monitoring
Th e fi nal point to note is that it is not suffi  cient for a state 
to rely on a written agreement, written assurances, or an in-
itial assessment that transfer to a third country complies with 
the Refugee Convention. Rather the state must monitor the 
treatment of refugees in the receiving state to assess on an on-
going basis whether transfers can continue to be undertaken 
in accordance with international law.99 As Justice Phelan ex-
plained in Canadian Council of Refugees v. R, the purpose of 
a continuous review is to
address the fact that new matters may develop, practices and 
policies of the third country may shift  depending on the current 
administration, and that opinions formed initially are not im-
mutable and must be re-examined in the light of more current 
opinion and other evidence of the third country’s actual, rather 
than, claimed compliance.100
Such ongoing assessment should focus on the application 
of laws and regulations to refugees in the receiving state in 
general, but also on individual refugees transferred under a 
protection elsewhere scheme. Th is issue has been addressed 
by the Human Rights Committee in the context of the im-
plied non-refoulement obligations in the ICCPR. It has ex-
plained that when a state party expels a person to another 
state on the basis of assurances as to that person’s treatment 
by the receiving state, it must “institute credible mechanisms 
for ensuring compliance by the receiving state with these as-
surances from the moment of expulsion.”101 Accordingly, in 
Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, the HRC held that the diplo-
matic assurances from Egypt relied upon by Sweden were in-
suffi  cient to discharge Sweden’s non-refoulement obligations, 
inter alia, because they “contained no mechanism for mon-
itoring of their enforcement.”102 Th e HRC continued:
Nor were any arrangements made outside the text of the assur-
ances themselves which would have provided for eff ective imple-
mentation. Th e visits by the State party’s ambassador and staff  
commenced fi ve weeks aft er the return, neglecting altogether a 
period of maximum exposure to risk of harm. Th e mechanics 
of the visits that did take place, moreover, failed to conform to 
key aspects of international good practice by not insisting on 
private access to the detainee and inclusion of appropriate med-
ical and forensic expertise, even aft er substantial allegations of 
ill-treatment emerged.103
Th is highlights the fact that the ongoing analysis of the 
treatment of refugees in the third (receiving) state is not just 
a formalistic legal one, but must take into account practical 
realities.
Where a state has actual or constructive knowledge of 
violations of the Refugee Convention or other international 
legal obligations by the receiving state, it can no longer, in 
good faith, assert that transfers can be made in accordance 
with international law.104 In such a case, the sending state is 
“disentitled from eff ecting any further transfers to that state 
under a protection elsewhere policy unless and until there is 
clear evidence that the breach has ceased.”105 A clear example 
of such a situation is the well-documented risk of indirect or 
chain refoulement on sending a refugee applicant to Greece 
under the Dublin Regulation, discussed above. Indeed, not 
only have the UNHCR and a number of well-respected 
non-government sources called for all EU Member States to 
place a moratorium on transfers to Greece, but the European 
Commission has reportedly initiated infringement proceed-
ings against the Greek government for failing to adhere to 
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the requirements of the Dublin Regulation, in particular 
the requirement to substantively examine the refugee claim 
of a person transferred to Greece under the Dublin regula-
tion.106 In light of this, it is diffi  cult to understand how any 
state could deny that a violation of Article 33 is a foreseeable 
consequence of transferring a refugee applicant to Greece. 
However to date only Norway has halted all transfers, with 
other states preventing transfers only of a certain category 
(e.g. children) or in individual cases.107
Where, in contrast to the above situation, a state transfers 
a person to a third state in good faith, that is, with no actual 
or constructive knowledge that the third state will not respect 
the refugee’s rights, but the third state in fact violates the 
refugee’s rights, the Michigan Guidelines concluded that the 
sending state is not under a strict legal obligation to receive 
such refugees back into its territory and provide Convention 
protection.108 Th is is because a state is responsible for the 
foreseeable consequences of expulsion/deportation/remov-
al,109 and not for any future (unforeseeable) violations of 
that person’s rights that may later occur in the other jurisdic-
tion.110 However, the Michigan Guidelines recommend that 
the sending state should, where possible, consider facilitating 
“the return and readmission of the refugee in question to its 
territory, and ensure respect for her rights there in line with 
the requirements of the Convention.”111
Conclusion
Th is article has explained that, while technically permit-
ted at international law, schemes by which states attempt to 
transfer responsibility over refugees are subject to stringent 
limitations which must be respected if transfers are to be ef-
fected lawfully. As has been displayed, these constraints are 
not insignifi cant—a point also conceded by the judiciary. 
In the Adan case, counsel for the Secretary of State argued 
that the House of Lords should not require the UK to ensure 
that each EU state complies with the one “true autonomous 
meaning” of the Refugee Convention because
[f]or the Secretary of State to be required to assess the details 
of the judgments of the appellate courts of other EU States, and 
form a judgment on whether they are consistent with the 1951 
Convention, with that judgment subject to reassessment by the 
courts of this country by way of judicial review, would impose a 
complex and time consuming task that is inconsistent with, and 
would substantially frustrate, the objective of the 1996 Act to 
implement the principles in the Dublin Convention and speed-
ily return asylum seekers to other EU States for the merits of 
their claims to be considered.112
Lord Steyn dismissed this, concluding that the obligation 
to monitor compliance of other states with the Refugee 
Convention was manageable and that the “the sky will not 
fall in” as a result of this requirement. Further, in Yogathas, 
concerns about effi  ciency could not be said to obviate the 
need for rigorous scrutiny of the legality of a transfer. Th is 
does give rise to the question whether the safe third coun-
try/protection elsewhere concept is able, in conformity with 
international law, to achieve many of its aims. Th at is, if states 
must essentially engage in a form of refugee status determin-
ation prior to transferring an applicant, it does tend to call 
into question whether such schemes are capable of fulfi lling 
their aims.
Indeed, research undertaken by ECRE led to the con-
clusion that “at best, the Dublin regulation adds a lengthy, 
cumbersome procedure to the beginning of the asylum pro-
cess.”113 Th e European Parliament has recently noted that 
the “low level of eff ected transfers” is an indicator of the 
“defi ciencies of the Dublin system.”114 Indeed the European 
Parliament has called for urgent reform of the system, noting 
that in the absence of “a genuine common European asylum 
system” the Dublin system “will continue to be unfair both to 
asylum seekers and Member States.”115
Th is would tend to suggest that safe third country schemes 
are unworkable and undermine refugee protection, and that 
developed countries should dedicate their considerable re-
sources to fashioning solutions to the refugee crisis by de-
veloping policies truly concerned to address the human 
rights and needs of refugees.
Notes
 1. It should be noted that some of the key ideas in this paper 
draw upon and develop further the analysis set out in 
Michelle Foster, “Protection Elsewhere: Th e Legal Implica-
tions of Requiring Refugees to Seek Protection in Another 
State” (2007) 28:2 Mich. J. Int’l L. 223; and “Colloquium, 
Th e Michigan Guidelines on Protection Elsewhere” (2007) 
28 Mich. J. Int’l L. 207 [Michigan Guidelines].
 2. Stephen H. Legomsky, “Secondary Refugee Movements 
and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Th ird Countries: Th e 
Meaning of Eff ective Protection” (2003) 15 Int’l J. Refugee 
L. 567 at 570–1.
 3. Article 4, online: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department 
/ laws-policy/safe-third.asp> (date accessed: 22 January 
2009).
 4. Indeed, this is oft en the purported purpose of these 
schemes. For example, the Regulatory Impact and Analysis 
Statement accompanying the Canadian Regulations states 
that the STCA refl ects a “widespread and growing inter-
national consensus that no refugee receiving country can, 
on its own, solve the refugee problems of the world. Inter-
national obligations necessitate a sharing of responsibil-
ity”: Canadian Council for Refugees, Canadian Council of 
Churches, Amnesty International, and John Doe v. R. [2007] 
73
 Responsibility Sharing or Shift ing? “Safe” Th ird Countries and International Law  
Refuge25-2.indd   73 5/25/10   5:51:33 PM
F.C. J. No. 1583; 2007 FC 1262 [Canadian Council of Refu-
gees v. R.] at para. 30.
 5. European Parliament resolution of 2 September 2008 on 
the evaluation of the Dublin system (2007/2262 (INI)) at 
paragraph M. Th e Resolution further notes that “a correct 
implementation of the Dublin Regulation may well result in 
the unequal distribution of responsibility for persons seek-
ing protection, to the detriment of some Member States 
particularly exposed to migration fl ows simply on the 
grounds of their geographical location” (para. H); that “the 
Commission’s evaluation reveals that, in 2005, the thirteen 
Member States at the borders of the Union had to deal with 
increasing challenges raised by the Dublin system” (para. 
I); and that “southern Member states are having to accept 
asylum applications from irregular immigrants without any 
assistance from third countries which are obliged to pro-
vide such assistance under international law” (para. K).
 6. European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), Shar-
ing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin 
Reconsidered (March 2008) at 13, online: <http://www.ecre.
org/topics/asylum_in_EU/determining_responsibility> 
(date accessed: 16 January 2009). 
 7. Th ere are now several EU directives on various aspects of 
refugee law: see for example Council Directive 2003/9/EC 
of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers (Reception Directive); Council 
Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum stan-
dards for the qualifi cation and status of third country na-
tionals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of 
the protection granted (Qualifi cation Directive); and Coun-
cil Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum 
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status (Procedures Directive).
 8. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2005 
Global Refugee Trends (2006), online: <http://www.unhcr.
org/statistics/> (date accessed: 22 January 2009). For simi-
lar fi gures in respect of Iraqi applicants, see UNHCR, Asy-
lum in the European Union: A Study of the Implementation 
of the Qualifi cation Directive, (November 2007) [UNHCR 
2007] at 13, online: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/
vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=473050632&page=search> 
(date accessed: 23 January 2009).
 9. Th is was also recognized in the European Parliament’s 
Resolution, supra note 5 at para. P: “whereas recognition 
rates of candidates for refugee status vary for certain third 
country nationals from approximately 0% to 90% within 
Member States.” 
 10. Th ere is a considerable body of literature concerned with 
the defi ciencies of the US system in this context: see for 
example Audrey Macklin, “Disappearing Refugees: Re-
fl ections on the U.S.-Canada Safe Th ird Country Agree-
ment” (2004–2005) 36 Colum. H.R.L. Rev. 365; Andrew F. 
Moore, “Unsafe in America: A Review of the U.S.-Canada 
Safe Th ird Country Agreement” (2007) 47 Santa Clara L. 
Rev. 201; Amy K. Arnett, “One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back: Women Asylum-Seekers in the United States and 
Canada Stand to Lose Human Rights under the Safe Th ird 
Country Agreement” (2005) 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 951; 
Lynn S. Hodgens, “Domestic Silence: How the U.S.-Canada 
Safe Th ird Country Agreement Brings New Urgency to the 
Need for Gender based Asylum Regulations” (2006) 30 Vt. 
L. Rev. 1045; Cara D. Cutler, “Th e U.S.-Canada Safe Th ird 
Country Agreement: Slamming the Door on Refugees” 
(2004) 11 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 121; Sonia Akibo-Betts, 
“Th e Canada-U.S. Safe Th ird Country Agreement: Reinfor-
cing Refugee Protection or Putting Refugees at Risk” (2006) 
J. Inst. Just. Int’l Stud. 1; and Lara Sarbit, “Th e Reality Be-
neath the Rhetoric: Probing the Discourses Surrounding 
the Safe Th ird Country Agreement” (2003) 18 J.L. & Soc. 
Pol’y 138.
 11. Canadian Council of Refugees v. R., supra note 4 at para. 81. 
It should be noted that the arguments concerning compli-
ance of the scheme with Canada’s Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms will not be considered in this article.
 12. Ibid. 
 13. It should be noted that an application seeking leave to ap-
peal against the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal was 
lodged in the Canadian Supreme Court on 26 September 
2008. It should also be noted that the Canadian Council 
for Refugees et al. have instituted a complaint in the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights concerning the 
STCA, and the case has been found admissible: see John 
Doe et al. v. Canada Report No 121/06 2006 IACHR 240, 
2006 WL 4557625 (OAS), 27 October 2006.
 14. See R. v. Canadian Council for Refugees, Canadian Coun-
cil of Churches, Amnesty International and John Doe [2008] 
F.C.J. No. 1002; 2008 FCA 229 at para. 2, per Noel J.A., with 
whom Richard C.J. agreed (R. v. Canadian Council for Refu-
gees Appeal Decision).
 15. Ibid. at paras. 76–80.
 16. Th e only reference to a substantive issue is at para. 81 of 
Justice Noel’s judgment (ibid.), where he states that, “I 
should add as an aside that even if “actual compliance” was 
a condition precedent, the conclusion reached by the Ap-
plications judge to the eff ect that the U.S. did not meet that 
requirement at the time of promulgation could not stand 
since it is largely based on evidence which postdates the 
time of the designation… .” Again however this does not 
call into question Justice Phelan’s assessment that, at the 
time of judgment, the STCA did not comply with Canada’s 
international obligations under Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention and Article 3 of the Convention Against Tor-
ture (CAT).
 17. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 
1968, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Article 31 (entered into force 27 
January 1988) [VCLT].
 18. R. v. Canadian Council for Refugees Appeal Decision, supra 
note 14 at para. 114.
 19. Ibid. 
Volume 25 Refuge Number 2
74
Refuge25-2.indd   74 5/25/10   5:51:33 PM
 20. See generally, James C. Hathaway, Th e Rights of Refuges 
under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2005).
 21. See Foster, supra note 1, 231–235.
 22. VCLT, supra note 17, Article 31.
 23. Hathaway, supra note 20, 659–694.
 24. Ibid.
 25. Canadian Council of Refugees v. R., supra note 4, para. 137 
(c).
 26. Regina (ex parte Yogathas) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2003] 1 A.C. 920, cited in Canadian Council of 
Refugees v. R., supra note 4 at para. 125.
 27. Affi  davits of James C. Hathaway and Kay Hailbronner, fi le 
IMM-7818-05, on fi le with author.
 28. For example, in James C. Hathaway’s affi  davit, he summar-
izes the other expert affi  davits fi led in these proceedings 
which suggest “several laws or practices of the United States 
which may deprive refugees of acquired rights in relevant 
cases,” including Article 3, Article 25, Article 31(1), Article 
31(2), and Article 34: see at para. 21 of affi  davit, on fi le with 
author. It should be noted that Justice Phelan did consider 
the issues of detention and access to counsel, but only as 
they related to the risk of refoulement, discussed below.
 29. Secton 102(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protec-
tion Act (IRPA) provides that the Governor-in-Council may 
designate a country as being subject to s. 101(1)(e) (which 
renders a claim ineligible where a person came directly or 
indirectly to Canada from that country) where the country 
complies with Article 33 of the Refugee Convention and 
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. In deciding 
to designate a country, the GIC is required to consider four 
factors in 102(2) including (c) its human rights record, but 
the inquiry still appears to be focused on compliance with 
Article 33.
 30. See Michigan Guidelines, supra note 1 at para. 8.
 31. NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration 
and Multicultural and Indigenous Aff airs (2005) 222 CLR 
161 at para. 31.
 32. It should be noted that the legislation (Migration Act 1958 
(Cth)) has been amended several times subsequent to this 
decision, so there is little interesting case law that has sought 
to develop this further. 
 33. T.I. v.Th e United Kingdom, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 435, 456–
57: “Where States establish international organizations or 
mutatis mutandis international agreements to pursue co-
operation in certain fi elds of activity there may be impli-
cations for the protection of fundamental rights. It would 
be incompatible with the purpose and object of the [Euro-
pean] Convention if Contracting States were thereby ab-
solved from their responsibility under the Convention in 
relation to the fi eld of activity covered by such attribution.”
 34. Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 
1569 (2007) on Assessment of Transit and Processing Centres 
as a Response to Mixed Flows of Migrants and Asylum Seek-
ers, 1 October 2007. Res. 1569 (2007) at para. 13.6.
 35. Erika Feller, “Asylum, Migration and Refugee Protection: 
Realities, Myths and the Promise of Th ings to Come” (2006) 
Int’l J. Refugee L. 510, 529.
 36. Foster, supra note 1 at 270.
 37. I am grateful to Martin Jones for his insights on this point 
based on a paper he presented on the panel, Protection 
Elsewhere: Th e Challenges and Opportunities for Inter-
national Refugee Protection, at 12th International Metrop-
olis Conference, Migration, Economic Growth and Social 
Cohesion, 8–12 October 2007, Melbourne, Australia.
 38. Katarzyna Grabska, “Brothers or Poor Cousins? Rights, 
Policies and the Well-being of Refugees in Egypt,” in 
Katarzyna Grabska and Lyla Mehta, eds., Forced Displace-
ment: Why Rights Matter (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan 
2008) at 77.
 39. Ibid. at 82–3.
 40. Ibid. at 83.
 41. I note that although Israel’s “hot returns” policy to Egypt 
was temporarily suspended in late 2007, on 23 August 
2008, Israel resumed summarily returning asylum seekers 
to Egypt: see Amnesty International, “Israel/Egypt: At least 
91 asylum-seekers and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa,” 
AI Index: MDE 15/038/2008 03 September 2008, online: 
<http://www2.amnesty.se/uaonnet.nsf/7d4a30a4bfe49590c
1257011005d92fb /282a1deb281377cac12574ba00307d86/
$FILE/51503808.pdf> (date accessed: 23 January 2009).
 42. See Achilles Skordas and Nicholas Sitaropoulos, “Why 
Greece Is Not a Safe Host Country for Refugees” (2004) 
16:1 Int’l J. Refugee L. 25.
 43. UNHCR, UNHCR Position on the Return of Asylum-Seekers 
to Greece under the “Dublin Regulation” (15 April 2008) at 
1 [UNHCR 2008], online: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4805bde42> (date ac-
cessed: 23 January 2009). 
 44. Reception Directive, supra note 7, at preambular para. (7). 
Th is has also been a concern raised by the European Parlia-
ment in its Resolution of 2nd September on the evaluation of 
the Dublin system (2007/2262 (INI)) at para. E: “whereas 
some Member States do not apply the Reception Directive 
eff ectively, either to asylum applicants awaiting transfer to 
another Member State under the Dublin Regulation, or at 
the point of return to the Member State responsible.”
 45. Commission of the European Communities v. Hellenic Re-
public, Case C-72/06, Judgment of the Court (Fift h Cham-
ber) of 19 April 2007.
 46. Th is is because the Reception Directive (supra note 7) sets 
out minimum standards that in some respects fall below 
that required by international law. For example, Article 
13(2) provides that “Member States shall make provisions 
on material reception conditions to ensure a standard of 
living adequate for the health of applicants and capable of 
ensuring their subsistence,” which is arguably a lower stan-
dard than that required by Article 11 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICE-
SCR). See also Article 10 of the Reception Directive, which 
75
 Responsibility Sharing or Shift ing? “Safe” Th ird Countries and International Law  
Refuge25-2.indd   75 5/25/10   5:51:34 PM
states that education can be delivered in accommodation 
centres and thus is only required to be delivered “under 
similar conditions” as nationals, which may well consti-
tute a lower standard than that required by Article 13 of 
the ICESCR; and see also Article 15 of the Reception Dir-
ective which only requires states to ensure “that applicants 
receive the necessary health care which shall include, at 
least, emergency care and essential treatment of illness,” 
compared with Article 12 of the ICESCR. 
 47. “Sweden halts return of child asylum seekers to 
Greece,” TT/Th e Local: Sweden’s news in English (7 
May 2008), online: <http://www.thelocal.se/article.
php?ID=11584&print=true> (date accessesd: 25 Septem-
ber 2008); see also Human Rights Watch, Stuck in a Re-
volving Door: Iraqis and other Asylum Seekers and Migrants 
at the Greece/Turkey Entrance to the European Union (26 
November 2008) at 21, online: <http://www.hrw.org/en/
reports/2008/11/26/stuck-revolving-door?print> (date ac-
cessed: 16 January 2009).
 48. VG Giessen 2 L 201/08.GI.A (25 April 2008), trans. by Anne 
Kallies.
 49. VG Hamburg AE 368/08 (21 August 2008), trans. by Anne 
Kallies.
 50. UNHCR 2008, supra note 43 at para. 21.
 51. Ibid. at paras. 20–22.
 52. See Foster, supra note 1 at 275–278.
 53. Ibid.
 54. R (Limbuela) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2006] 1 A.C. 396 at para. 7. 
 55. Ibid. at para. 56; see also at para. 69 per Lord Scott. It 
should be noted that there is related jurisprudence con-
cerning states’ implied non-refoulement obligations as they 
pertain to violations of socio-economic rights which apply 
other than in the context of refugees. In such cases, both 
the House of Lords and European Court of Human Rights 
have applied a higher test for fi nding that transfer is pro-
hibited where the suff ering in the country of return would 
be a result of that country’s inability to provide basic socio-
economic rights to its citizens rather than unwillingness 
(see N (FC) (Appellant) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Respondent) [2005] UKHL 31; N v. Th e United 
Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, Application 
No. 26565/05, Strasbourg, 27 May 2008). However the line 
of reasoning in Limbuela is more applicable to the present 
discussion since the harm faced by refugees in some “safe 
third countries” is clearly the result of intentional depriva-
tion of socio-economic rights along the same lines as that 
at issue in Limbuela.
 56. See for example C. v. Australia (900/1999), ICCPR, A/58/40 
vol. II (28 October 2002) 188 (CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999); 
Williams v. Jamaica (609/1995), ICCPR, A/53/40 vol. II (4 
November 1997) 63 (CCPR/C/61/D/609/1995); Smith and 
Stewart v. Jamaica (668/1995), ICCPR, A/54/40 vol. II (8 
April 1999) 163 (CCPR/C/65/D/668/1995); and Rouse v. 
Th e Philippines (1089/2002), ICCPR, A/60/40 vol. II (25 
July 2005) 123. For similar jurisprudence in the European 
Court of Human Rights see Kalashnikov v. Russia, Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, Application no. 47095/99.
 57. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment 
No. 6 (2005), Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated 
Children Outside Th eir Country of Origin, CRC/GC/2005/6 
(1 September 2005) at para. 27. 
 58. See generally, Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law 
and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), especially at 
201–235 [Foster, Refuge from Deprivation].
 59. UNHCR, UNHCR’s Views on the Concept of Eff ective Pro-
tection as it Relates to Indonesia (2 December 2004; on fi le 
with author).
 60. Ibid.
 61. See generally, Foster, Refuge from Deprivation, supra note 
58.
 62. UNHCR 2008, supra note 43 at para. 18. A similar case 
was put forward in the Canadian litigation, in that the ap-
plicants asserted that the policy of detaining some asylum 
seekers and also the failure to provide legal counsel to refu-
gee claimants aggravated the risk of refoulement. Justice 
Phelan dismissed these claims, not on the basis that they 
were incapable of validity in law, but rather that there was 
no evidential basis to support them: see Canadian Council 
of Refugees v. R., supra note 4 at paras. 228–236.
 63. ECRE, supra note 6 at 18.
 64. See for example, R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] AC 514 per Lord Bridge 
of Harwich at 532D; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Yogathas [2002] 4 All ER 800. Th is 
was also accepted by all parties in the Canadian litigation: 
as Justice Phelan noted this is consistent with the Suresh 
decision of the Canadian Supreme Court; see Canadian 
Council of Refugees v. R., supra note 4 at para. 112. Th is was 
also explicitly accepted by Evans J.A. in the Federal Court 
of Appeal: see R. v. Canadian Council for Refugees Appeal 
Decision, supra note 14 at para. 123.
 65. For an excellent analysis of the requirements of inter-
national law, see Gerald P. Heckman, “Canada’s Refugee 
Status Determination System and the International Norm 
of Independence” (2008) 25:2 Refuge 79. 
 66. Erika Feller (Director, Department of International Protec-
tion, UNHCR) presentation (at the IARLJ World Confer-
ence, Judicial or Administrative Protection: Legal Systems 
within the Asylum Processes. Stockholm, 21 April 2005), 
online: <http://www.unhcr.org/admin/ADMIN/42a404cf2.
html> (date accessed: 30 September 2008). 
 67. See also Global Consultations on International Protection, 
Asylum Processes (Fair and Effi  cient Asylum Procedures), 
EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001 at 13; para. (o).
 68. Ibid. at 13; para. (p).
 69. UNHCR 2007, supra note 8 at 34.
 70. UNHCR 2007, supra note 8 at 13–14.
 71. Ibid. at 32.
Volume 25 Refuge Number 2
76
Refuge25-2.indd   76 5/25/10   5:51:34 PM
 72. I note that the relevance of the views of the UNHCR was 
a contentious issue in the US-Canada STCA litigation be-
cause the UNHCR had consistently stated that the US was 
a “safe third country.” Justice Phelan was correct to under-
take his Honour’s own assessment of this question, as a 
state cannot rely on the UNHCR alone.
 73. See Michael Kagan, “Frontier Justice: Legal Aid and UN-
HCR Refugee Status Determination in Egypt” (2006) 19:1 
Journal of Refugee Studies 45 at 48.
 74. Richard Towle and Richard Stainsby, “Best Practices for 
Refugee Status Determination: A UNHCR Global Perspec-
tive” (Paper presented at the conference Best Practices for 
Refugee Status Determination, Monash University and 
Université de Montréal, Prato Centre, Italy, 29–30 May 
2008), slides on fi le with author.
 75. See RSD Watch, “UNHCR recognition rates rise in the wake 
of new standards” (24 July 2008), online: <http://rsdwatch.
org/index_fi les/Page6947.htm> (date accesssed: 1 October 
2008); and RSD Watch, “Large UNHCR RSD operations 
will give detailed written reasons for rejection to asylum-
seekers denied protection” (29 September 2008), online: 
<http://rsdwatch.org/index_fi les/Page7071.htm> (date ac-
cessed: 1 October 2008).
 76. Th is is particularly an issue when the sending state has it-
self set up an inferior refugee status determination proced-
ure in the third state, such as occurred in the context of 
Australia’s “Pacifi c Solution”: see Savitri Taylor, “Protection 
Elsewhere/Nowhere” (2006) 18 Int’l J. Refugee L. 283; and 
Susan Kneebone, “Th e Pacifi c Plan: Th e Provision of ‘Ef-
fective Protection?’” (2006) 18 Int’l J. Refugee L. 696.
 77. Th is has been noted as an issue of concern recently by the 
European Parliament in the context of the Dublin system: 
“whereas there is evidence that some Member States do not 
guarantee eff ective access to a procedure for determining 
refugee status”: supra note 5 at para. D.
 78. Decision No 162.040 of 28 August 2006; trans. by Nawaar 
Hassan. 
 79. Michigan Guidelines, supra note 1.
 80. R. (ex parte Adan) v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment [2001] 2 A.C. 477; (2001) 2 W.L.R. 143 at 154 (per 
Lord Steyn) [Adan].
 81. R. (Yogathas) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2003] 1 A.C. 920 at para. 9 [Yogathas].
 82. Canadian Council of Refugees v. R., supra note 4 at para. 
137.
 83. T.I. v. Th e United Kingdom, supra note 33, as cited in Yoga-
thas, supra note 81 at para. 54.
 84. Canadian Council of Refugees v. R., supra note 4 at paras. 
165–196 (exclusion) and paras. 197–216 (inclusion 
clause).
 85. UNHCR 2007, supra note 8 at 42–46.
 86. Ibid. at 47–52.
 87. Ibid. at 90–95.
 88. See generally Yogathas, supra note 81; and T.I. v. Th e United 
Kingdom, supra note 33. 
 89. Yogathas supra note 81 at para. 9 (per Lord Bingham).
 90. Th is was emphasized recently by the UK Court of Appeal in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Nasseri [2008] 
EWCA 464 where Lord Justice Laws stated “it is underlined 
by the need of rigorous scrutiny where an individual claims 
that expulsion will expose him to Article 3 ill treatment”: at 
para. 18.
 91. Yogathas, supra note 81 at para. 58 (per Lord Hope).
 92. R. v. Canadian Council for Refugees Appeal Decision, supra 
note 14 at para. 130.
 93. Ibid. at para. 123.
 94. Ibid.
 95. Ibid., relying on Singh v. Minister of Employment and Im-
migration [1985] 1 SCR 177.
 96. See Canadian Council of Refugees v. R., supra note 4 at para. 
34 (Phelan J.). Once a CBSA offi  cer decides that a person 
is ineligible to be referred to the IRB, a removal order is 
issued which is most oft en carried out on the same day.
 97. R. v. Canadian Council for Refugees Appeal Decision, supra 
note 14 at para. 125.
 98. See UNHCR, “Th e Dublin II Regulation: A UNHCR Dis-
cussion Paper” (April 2006) at 19–20; online: <http://www.
unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=44
45fe344&page=search> (date accessed: 24 January 2009). 
Th e European Parliament has similarly asked the European 
Commission “to amend Articles 19 and 20 of the Dublin 
Regulation on ‘taking charge and taking back’, so as to pro-
vide applicants with an automatic suspensory right of ap-
peal against a decision to transfer responsibility to another 
Member State under the Dublin Regulation.”: Resolution of 
2 September at para. 10; see also Legomsky, supra note 2 at 
672; and ECRE, supra note 6 at 166.
 99. In Yogathas, Lord Hope made it clear that integral to his 
decision to allow return to Germany was the fact that the 
Secretary of State was “able to show that he based his de-
cision on a state of knowledge resulting from his own in-
quiries as to the practice in Germany and from his experi-
ence of constantly monitoring the performance by member 
states of their obligations in similar cases”: supra note 81 at 
para. 47. 
 100. Canadian Council of Refugees v. R., supra note 4 at para. 274. 
Th ese comments were made in the context of his Honour’s 
assessment of whether the Canadian government had con-
ducted required reviews under subsection 102(3) of the 
IRPA, which provides that: “Th e Governor-in-Council 
must ensure the continuing review of factors set out in sub-
section (2) with respect to each designated country”: see 
ibid. at para. 265. Since there had been no such review as 
at the date of judgment, Phelan J. held that the GIC had 
failed to ensure the continuous review of the s. 102(2) fac-
tors: see at para. 275. While this fi nding was overturned by 
the Federal Court of Appeal (see R. v. Canadian Council for 
Refugees Appeal Decision, supra note 14 at para. 97 per Noel 
J.A. with whom Richard C.J. agreed; Evans J.A. not consid-
77
 Responsibility Sharing or Shift ing? “Safe” Th ird Countries and International Law  
Refuge25-2.indd   77 5/25/10   5:51:35 PM
ering), this does not detract from Phelan’s explanation of 
the need for and importance of ongoing review.
 101. UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: 
Sweden, at para. 79 (12)(b), UN Doc A/57/40, 57, vol I 
(2002).
 102. Ibid. at para. 11.5.
 103. Ibid.
 104. Foster, supra note 1 at 284–5.
 105. Michigan Guidelines, supra note 1 at para. 15.
 106. See letter from Amnesty International’s EU Offi  ce to Mr. 
Dragutin Mate, Minister of the Interior, EU Presidency 
(8 March 2008), on fi le with author. According to ECRE, 
supra note 6, details of the action against Greece have not 
been made public, but it is understood to relate to “the lack 
of legal guarantees with regard to a substantive examina-
tion of the asylum claim by Greek authorities aft er transfer 
to Greece” at 14. 
 107. See “A gamble with the right of asylum in Europe: Greek 
policy and the Dublin II regulation,” Report by NOAS, 
Norwegian Helsinki Committee and Greek Helsinki Mon-
itor (9 April 2008), online: <http://www.statewatch.org/
news/2008/apr/greece-dublin.pdf> (date accesssed 2 Octo-
ber 2008). Human Rights Watch reports that Finland has 
announced that it “would suspend transferring migrants to 
Greece unless it received written assurances from Greece 
that they would be fairly processed” (supra note 47 at 21); 
however it is unclear whether such assurances have or have 
not been granted.
 108. See Foster, supra note 1 at 285.
 109. In all of these cases, the test is said to be one of forseeability; 
viz: “Th e forseeability of the consequence would mean that 
there was a present violation by the State party, even though 
the consequence would not occur until later on”: Kindler 
v. Canada, Human Rights Committee Communication No. 
470/1991; CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 30 July 1993 at para. 
6.2. 
 110. “If a person is lawfully expelled or extradited, the State party 
concerned will not generally have responsibility under the 
Covenant for any violations of that person’s rights that may 
later occur in the other jurisdiction. In that sense a State 
party clearly is not required to guarantee the rights of per-
sons within another jurisdiction’: Kindler, ibid. at para. 6.2. 
Further, the principles of state responsibility regarding 
reparation do not accommodate this situation very well 
because they only envisage harm to states, rather than to 
individuals. Th us, there is little authority in international 
law for the position that the “injured” state in this context is 
required to remedy the breach by taking the person back.
 111. Michigan Guidelines, supra note 1 at 285.
 112. Adan, supra note 80 at 518.
 113. ECRE, supra note 6 at 11.
 114. European Parliament, supra note 5 at para. G.
 115. Ibid. at 3 (para. 2).
Michelle Foster, S.J.D., is a Senior Lecturer and Director of the 
International Refugee Law Research Programme in the Institute 
for International Law and the Humanities at Melbourne 
Law School. Th e author would like to thank the organizers 
and participants at the conference Best Practices for Refugee 
Status Determination, Monash University and Université de 
Montréal, Prato Centre, Italy, 29–30 May 2008, for their help-
ful feedback on this paper. She would also like to thank Nawaar 
Hassan and Anne Kallies of Melbourne Law School for excel-
lent research assistance, and Dr. Constantin Hruschka of the 
UNHCR for providing updated German case law.
Volume 25 Refuge Number 2
78
Refuge25-2.indd   78 5/25/10   5:51:36 PM
